Catalonia´s and Scotland´s Flags. Edinburgh, 2014. Flickr. Some rights reserved.
Secessionist movements are numerous and they come
in all shapes and sizes. In my research I have identified 55 active
secessionist movements around the world as recently as 2011. These aspiring
nations exist in a variety of countries running the spectrum from repressive
authoritarian regimes to advanced democracies. Many of these movements have
been violent, responsible for roughly half the civil wars since 1945.
One might think that democracy should reduce
secessionism by providing minority groups with greater political voice and
presenting them with non-violent political options. This is partly true. The data
show that violent secessionism is less likely in advanced democracies, but we
do not know exactly why this is the case. Secessionists are simply less
inclined to take up arms – and, indeed, to even take this option seriously – in
wealthy democratic societies.
However, democracy is hardly a panacea for
secessionism. There is some evidence that secessionism is most likely in
transition regimes that are moving toward democracy. The introduction of
democratic institutions opens up a socio-political environment where minority
leaders can play the nationalist card, campaign on identity-based issues, and seek
to exit the state via secession. It is thought that mature democracies can
overcome this problem by co-opting elites, in effect showing them that
political voice is a better option than political exit. This view comes close
to conventional wisdom in academic circles, and some have concluded that
secessionism should disappear as a society makes the transition to advanced democracy.
But democracy does not reduce secessionism, it
transforms it. To be sure, violent conflict is less common, and that is a good
thing. However, as the recent experiences in Scotland and Catalonia show,
secessionism in modern democracies is remarkably durable. In fact, it is
different from other forms of secessionism in important ways, and there are consequences
to this form of “democratized secession.”
One of the most important aspects of democratized
secession is its grassroots, bottom-up character. Secessionism
is almost always an elite-driven project in less developed and less democratic
societies, and political leaders can be co-opted by the state. But in regions
like Catalonia the leadership can be co-opted by the civic organizations that
stand for independence. It is said that Artur Mas, the president of Catalonia
and leader of the independence movement, only became a true secessionist in
2012 when the Spanish government failed to meet certain demands and the Catalan
National Assembly (ANC), a civic organization dedicated to secession, persuaded
Mas to join their side.
This bottom-up aspect of democratized secession is not a bad thing. After
all, nationalist sentiment flows from the people, and it seems truer than the
type of top-down projects where elites are seeking to manipulate national
identity. However, from the perspective of the state bottom-up secessionism is
harder to manage because the roots run deeper and the strategy of co-opting
elites is insufficient. Now the people must be co-opted.
This deep-rootedness lends durability to political parties and civic
organizations that advance independence. Many said that when the Scottish
nationalists lost the referendum last year the issue was put to rest for a
generation. But no one says that now that the Scottish National Party (SNP) has
surged in popularity and currently dominates Scottish politics. The SNP
leadership can bide its time and wait for London to offer the casus belli
that will legitimate another referendum.
In addition, secessionists in modern societies have an array of modern
tools to advance their cause. There is an old saying that a language is a
dialect with an army and navy. But Vicent Partal, a journalist, entrepreneur,
and supporter of Catalan independence, has upended the statement by claiming
that now a language is a dialect with Google coverage. Catalonia has its own
top-level domain (.cat) and it was the first stateless nation to get Google
coverage. This, according to Partal, has dramatically increased the spread and use
of Catalan, a vital element in the development of nationalism.
These are all aspects of democratized secession,
and all of them can be viewed in a positive light. Secessionism is not simply
some project of the elites. It is rooted in local culture, it has the ability
to shape political agendas, and the parties that come to embody these agendas
use democratic methods to advance the interests of their constituencies. Modern
communication assists these efforts by creating an open environment where ideas
can be expressed without interference from the state. Clearly, democratized
secession has its virtues.
The downside is the potential for instability. Secessionist projects create
divisiveness, not just between the region and the state, but also in the region
between those who want independence and those who do not. A common complaint
among Scots and Catalans is the divisiveness that arises in the community and
between friends and family. Secession is a very high-stakes issue, and there
are no clear rules or precedents for how easily and frequently referenda on
independence can be held. To a large extent the events in Scotland and
Catalonia are experiments in democratized secession.
Of equal concern is the way in which democratized secession changes the
bargaining relationship between the state and the region. The SNP can hold the
rest of the United Kingdom hostage over certain issues – like whether the U.K.
should remain in the European Union – by threatening to call another referendum
on independence. Thus, the very threat of political exit can be used to acquire
greater political voice.
This is why democratized secession is such a dilemma. On one hand,
sovereign borders are merely the accidents of history, the product of conquest
and the exchange of territory between governments. The correspondence between
borders and national identity is rarely the clean fit that state leaders want
us to believe. It seems intrinsically democratic and modern that minority
nations should be given the right to self-determine and even choose
independence under certain conditions.
On the other hand, there is a fickleness to nationalist identity and
critics are right to point out that easy-to-reach referenda and unfettered
self-determination can lead to instability. This sort of direct democracy is
high-stakes and highly divisive. Is a simple majority enough to break a country
in two, and, if so, can the minority later hold their own referendum on
independence?
Along with other scholars I have argued that the
right to secession highlights a basic tension between the liberal principle of
self-determination and the sovereign right of territorial integrity. This is a
conflict that sits at the heart of contemporary international relations, asking
which should take precedence – the right of the state to keep its territory or
the right of a people to choose their political fate. At some level all
secessionist movements raise this issue.
But there is another, perhaps more important, tension
that arises with democratized secession. The sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the state is not the obstacle here, at least not to the same
degree, because in its purest form democratized secession recognizes the importance
of self-determination. The tension here exists between two different notions of
liberal democracy, between the freedom to choose and the pursuit of political
stability. Who counts as a nation? How often can they call for a referendum?
What is the threshold for victory? These are the thorny issues raised by
democratized secession, and outside of philosophy departments we have hardly
begun to address them.
Part of the problem is the newness of
democratized secession. It is less acceptable for governments to suppress
secessionism in a global environment that is increasingly liberal and
democratic, provided the secessionists seek their ends in a peaceful and
democratic manner. Combined with this newness is apprehensiveness on the part
of governments to determine the appropriate procedures, create precedents, and
potentially assist in the creation of domestic secessionist movements.
The events in Scotland and Catalonia are
precedent-setting. They are writing the playbook for democratized secession and
will influence the future behaviour of governments and secessionists alike.