Mosa'ab Elshamy/AP/Press Association. All rights reserved.The
face of the Egyptian revolt is that of thousands of protestors occupying Tahrir Square in central Cairo, chanting for the fall of Mubarak, the Supreme Council
of the Armed Forced (SCAF), and the Muslim Brotherhood – all over the course of
three years.
The
narrative revolved around young, middle class, technology-literate activists who
used social media to galvanize the masses against the regime of the day.
However, this narrative ignores another side of the Egyptian revolt; the role
of the urban poor whose participation was key in the early successes of the
revolt, especially in the clashes that followed with SCAF and the Muslim
Brotherhood.
The
success of the first “Friday of Anger” came after the police force collapsed,
which was not prompted by the protestors storming the Square, but by the attacks on police stations by the urban poor. Ninety-nine police stations were set alight that day
as the urban poor exacted revenge against their tormentors.
This
narrative took a backseat for two main reasons. First, it contradicts the
notion that the uprising was essentially peaceful; a narrative that middle
class activists want to propagate as it garners sympathy both internationally
and domestically. In
reality, it was not as peaceful as many would like to think it was. The urban
poor confronted the coercive arm of the state with violence, which was
one of the main reasons the uprising against Mubarak was a success.
The
second reason is the middle class bias of the coverage of the revolution. The
revolution was portrayed by both national and international media as a movement
of the middle class, de-radicalizing its image and consequently removing the
urban poor and their demands from the political scene.
The
events of 2011 and its aftermath were not the first where the urban poor took on the state. The urban poor have played a prominent role in opposition politics for decades, especially in the new quarters that emerged
across Caro in the 1970s as the state started to reduce its welfare role.
The
most vivid examples were in the 1990s when Islamist militants, part of the al-Gama’a
al-Islamiyya, gained popular support among the urban poor. The neighbourhood of
Imbaba, for example, became a hotbed of militancy that required a massive police operation in 1992 to recapture it from the
militants. The Gama’a was able to gain poplar support due its immersion into
the local customs of the popular quarters. They regulated the morality of the
neighbourhood, most importantly sexual morality, and gained prominence by acting
as arbitrators in intercommunal conflicts – a role that the Emir of Imbaba,
Sheikh Gaber, played well. This allowed him to gain the support and respect of residents.
Why do the urban poor pose
a threat to political order?
This
can be attributed to the spatial, political and economic nature of popular
quarters that emerged from the 1970s onwards around Cairo. As the state started
to retreat from the Nasserist social contract, taking a neo-liberal turn, it
reneged on its commitment to provide affordable urban housing, which prompted new
quarters to naturally emerge and come to life on agricultural or state-owned
desert lands. They were illegal settlements inhabited either by rural migrants
or by inhabitants of the city who could not afford to move within the old
quarters. Thus, the mere illegal nature of these quarters placed the inhabitants
in opposition to the state.
These
neighbourhoods had limited to no government services. This created an
elaborate game of cat and mouse, as the urban poor attempted to negotiate, through
a maze of government corruption and bureaucracy, their relationship with the
state in order to obtain these basic services.
The
precarious nature of the urban poor becomes more apparent when one views their
means of making a living. Most of the inhabitants of these quarters are engaged
in the informal sector either as daily workers, peddlers or artisans working
within their own quarters. This trend was accelerated as hiring in the public
sector came to a halt coupled with the weakness of the private sector. With no
other choice, millions were forced to work informally.
Thus,
one could argue that the lack of government services along with informal
employment created a certain degree of independence for these inhabitants. I
would even argue that they view the state as more of a foe, since it attempts
to regulate and control the space they live in. This is made even more vivid when
power relations within these quarters are examined.
The elite structure of the
urban poor
Like
any other social group, the urban poor living in these quarters have an elite
structure. The elites get their power from three main sources.
First,
in their ability to act as mediators with the state, helping members of their
community obtain government services. This, of course goes both ways; the state
relies on their intervention to maintain peace within the quarter and they act
as gatekeepers, procuring government services in exchange for acting as
mediators.
Second,
is the relative wealth of these elites compared to the rest of the urban poor.
These elites constitute “lesser notables” as Salwa Ismail highlights; they are primarily
involved in trade and are mainly wholesalers or retailers, occupying the position
of the petty bourgeoisie below the bigger ruling elite nexus of military/crony
capitalists.
The
final pillar of their authority is moral. Their adherence to the traditional
values of the quarters allows them to act as mediators in inter-communal
conflicts. Their duty is to reach a peaceful resolution to the conflict. As
such, they have to be perceived as impartial judges between conflicting
parties. This stems from traditional values of honor. The importance of this
role stems from reliance on traditional methods of conflict resolution in an
attempt to reduce the role of the state, since it is perceived as corrupt or
unwilling to get involved. Thus, conflict is resolved through 'majaliss 'urfia'
or traditional councils, where the quarrelling parties lay down their case and
a negotiated settlement is reached.
The
job of policing the neighborhood and ensuring security is left to the inhabitants,
not the police, who are reluctant to get involved anyway. In some cases, the
police provide protection to petty criminals and drug dealers in exchange for becoming
informants. Thus, the role of the police in these quarters is aimed at
the subjection of the populace, with no focus on combating crime or resolving
conflict.
What does this mean in
terms of relations with the state?
This
can be answered by looking at the relations between the elites of these
quarters and the masses of the urban poor. Based on the role played by the
elites, one would expect that they would be easily coopted by the state,
however, in reality the picture is more complicated.
In
some cases, the elites were coopted by the state becoming members of the
Mubarak era ruling party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), acting as a tool
for government control. However, there are other cases where the elites ran for
parliament as independents, winning seats then being asked to join the NDP.
This shows a degree of independence from the ruling apparatus.
In
other cases, the local notable took up opposition politics in Islamist form,
most notably during the 1990s when militant Islamism became rife in these
quarters, such as Ain Shams and Imbaba.
Thus,
one can conclude that relations between the state and the elites is complicated
and subject to tensions. On the other hand, there is the relation between the
state and the populace, which is filled with antagonism and tension. The
populace is perceived as a security threat to the state, especially if you happen
to be young and male.
This
view has a number of manifestations. First, the popular quarters are spatially
separated from other parts of the city by security checkpoints that are designed
to restrict movement to and from these quarters. This involves the usual police
harassment, humiliation through identity and security checks.
Second,
is the practice of 'ishtibah we taharri', which translates into inquiry and
investigation, a
practice that allows police officers to interrogate citizens simply because they look suspicious.
This practice is used extensively against young males, which is sometimes also followed
by planting drugs on the apprehended.
Finally,
this securitization has been enshrined in the law, issued in 1998 and known as
the “thuggery” law, which punishes the use of
“physical intimidation” with hefty prison
sentences. This law has been mainly aimed at the urban poor.
So, who is afraid of the urban
poor? It
appears that the obvious answer is the ruling elites, however, that would be
too simple an answer. This fear is also prevalent among the urban middle class;
they fear the social upheaval and violence the urban poor can set in motion. As
such, they cling to the military regime in the hope that they will be protected from the tide of social unrest that now seems inevitable.
In
conclusion, everybody is afraid of the urban poor!