The European Organisation for Security (EOS), the chief lobby group for Europe’s “security industry” in 2011. Flickr/Security Defence Agenda. Some rights reserved.
The EU has hit troubled waters in recent years, but
divisions and tensions within the bloc have not halted significant advances in
the development and implementation of new security measures aiming to counter
terrorism, fight crime, ensure “border management” and protect critical
infrastructure at the same time as constructing a European “homeland security”
economy able to compete with states such as the USA, Israel and China.
Propelled by a healthy dose of corporate influence and
assistance, measures already in place or on the way include the EU-wide border
surveillance system Eurosur; a new network of ‘Passenger Information Units’ for
police profiling of air and, in the future, rail and ferry passengers;
biometric databases and recognition and identification systems for public and
private use alike; and new data-mining and predictive analysis tools that
foresee police forces wielding powers akin to those traditionally reserved for
intelligence agencies.
Such proposals would be unsavoury at any time – but in the
context of governments of all stripes normalising emergency powers, extending
the scale and scope of state surveillance, introducing restrictions on freedom
of speech and assembly, and cutting back on procedural rights in the criminal
justice system – these give particular cause for concern. Such proposals would be unsavoury at any time – but in
the context of governments of all stripes normalising emergency powers… these
give particular cause for concern.
Big ideas, big money
Market Forces, a
new report published by Statewatch and the Transnational Institute (TNI), puts
the EU’s security funds and strategies under the microscope, examining in
detail the European Security Research Programme (ESRP, worth €1.7 billion) and
the Internal Security Fund (ISF, worth €3.8 billion), which sit alongside a
host of other budgets that together add up to some €11 billion.
It was in the early years of the twenty-first century that
the EU first began providing significant funds for the development of new
“homeland security” technologies, based on an all-encompassing vision of
security seeking to combat a seemingly limitless number of “threats” – from
graffiti and petty crime to terrorism and natural disasters – and displaying a
marked tendency to treat the entire population (European but especially
non-European) as potential objects of suspicion that must be constantly
surveilled, monitored, checked and “neutralised” where necessary.
One instrumental budget in implementing this vision at the
borders was the 2007-13 €1.8 billion External Borders Fund (EBF), which
financed the purchase of thousands of vehicles, hundreds of surveillance
systems (covering thousands of kilometres of the EU’s borders), thousands of
gadgets such as night vision goggles and thermal imaging gear – all in the name
of implementing the EU’s “border management” model, with increasingly deadly
results for migrants and refugees.
The EBF has been followed up with the €2.5 billion Internal
Security Fund – Borders and Visas, whose counterpart (Internal Security Fund –
Police) is worth just over €1 billion. Under this fund, national programmes
were agreed between Member States and the Commission before the legislation was
even approved by the European Parliament.
It offers novelties such as “data analysis and phishing of
web content and social network sites” (Hungary), the purchase of IMSI catchers
and internet monitoring systems (Croatia), “gathering information using new IT
capabilities” (Romania), and the development of detection and analysis tools
with the aim of predicting future crimes (Greece and Malta). Further
technologies for use by national and EU authorities are to be developed
by the €1.7 billion ESRP.
Suspicious minds
This vision has been heavily influenced by military and
security corporations whose profits depend on a world of suspicions, fears and
threats – and who have not only been major beneficiaries of EU security
spending, but have also been given an unprecedented role in designing the ESRP,
from which they have acquired significant funds. This
vision has been heavily influenced by military and security corporations whose
profits depend on a world of suspicions, fears and threats.
Major corporate recipients of EU security research funding
between 2007 and December 2016 include:
- French arms giants Thales (€33.1 million, 72
projects) and Airbus (€14.2 million, €3.6 million, 34 projects); - Spanish companies Indra (€12.3 million for 16
projects) and Atos (€7.6 million ,16 projects) - Selex, a former subsidiary of Italian weapons
producer Finmeccanica (now renamed Leonardo) which received €23.2 million for
54 projects between 2007 and 2013.
Leading the way for the UK has been BAE Systems, which has
pocketed some €6.2 million for its role in 11 projects. Private companies,
large and small alike, have taken over €745.5 million from the security
research budget between 2007 and December 2016, some 43% of the total.
Major research institutes have also benefited massively from
EU security research funding – for example, Germany’s Fraunhofer Institute
(almost €66 million for its role in over 100 projects between 2007 and 2016), the
Netherlands-based TNO (€33.6 million, 61 projects), the Swedish Defence
Research Institute (€33.5 million, 56 projects) and France’s Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux
énergies alternatives (CEAS, over €22 million, 46 projects).
Sowing and reaping
Both transnational corporations and major research
institutes have, alongside representatives of EU and national security
agencies, long played a prominent role in the Protection and Security Advisory
Group (PASAG), a European Commission advisory group which helps set the
priorities for the security research work programmes.
Although the group has long played host to representatives
from the arms, security and technology industries (Thales, Morpho, Airbus,
Finmeccanica, Selex) and research institutes (Fraunhofer, TNO), the Commission
is currently working towards ““a slight overall increase of industry
representation.” The most significant move so far has been to appoint Alberto
de Benedictis, a former senior employee at Finmeccanica and chairman of arms
industry lobby group ASD, as PASAG chair.
Other paths for corporate influence are also well-trodden.
The European Organisation for Security (EOS), the chief lobby group for
Europe’s “security industry” has a declared annual lobbying expenditure of
hundreds of thousands of euros, and has in recent years ensured continued close
contacts between public and private officials in high-level policy forums and through
more discreet meetings.
Last summer, meanwhile, an EOS-led group, the European Cyber
Security Organisation, was awarded significant influence over the design of the
EU’s cybersecurity research agenda as part of a “public-private partnership” to
which the EU has committed €450 million.
Under the industrial
influence
The level of corporate influence over EU security
policy-making is no accident: one of the core objectives of EU security policy
is to ensure industry profits. As the Commission once put it: “A competitive EU
security industry is the conditio sine qua non of any viable European security policy and for economic growth
in general.” As the Commission once put it: “A
competitive EU security industry is the conditio sine qua non of any viable European security
policy and for economic growth in general.”
And while there is frequent talk of the need to ensure a
“true internal market for security” in the EU – amplifying the ability of
transnational corporations to sell to multiple governments at once – it seems
that a market in the traditional sense is not what is on offer. As a 2014 study
for the European Parliament noted with regard to certain public-private
collaboration schemes being established through the ESRP:
“In sharp contrast with the idea of shaping a security market… the
underlying idea here seems to be the promotion of a non-market commercial
relation between the 'security industry' and public sector customers.
As EOS itself has highlighted: “security is often in a
position of market failure,” where “the allocation of goods and services by a
free market is not efficient”. The industry’s dependence on public funds and
political support is thus giving rise to some novel governance structures – a
boon for the industry, which considers that it should have a far greater role
in determining public policy.
One clear example of the development of new “governance”
structures is in the efforts to ensure total surveillance of the EU’s sea
borders. The European Maritime Safety Agency is currently renting drones and
data analysis capacity from private companies through a series of multi-million
euro contracts. This is precisely the kind of activity that has been advocated
by the PASAG (in its previous guise as the Secure Societies Advisory Group,
SAG), which called for:
“new governance models with varied stakeholders. This should help
develop security capabilities that would otherwise be unaffordable or
impractical… Other models should also be tested to alleviate the acquisition
burdens [i.e. equipment, training and personnel costs] of the operators, by
transferring the responsibility to acquire and operate capability to the
private sector.”
From the
militarisation of civil security to the militarisation of the EU
The EU’s security project is also deliberately blurring the
line between civilian and military technologies. While legal obligations
require projects to have “an exclusive focus on civil applications,” the
Commission has rendered this meaningless with its intention to “evaluate how
the results [of research projects] could benefit also defence and security
industrial capabilities,” thus attempting to identify much sought-after
“synergies” between civilian and military technologies.
These initiatives are being capped with moves towards a
dedicated military research budget, with a €90 million “pilot project”
currently under way – exactly as was recommended by a high-level ‘Group of
Personalities’ convened by the Commission and drawn primarily from the arms
industry.
The next steps are more ambitious. In June the European
Commission proposed a ‘European Defence Fund’ that from 2020 onwards foresees
€1.5 billion in annual funding from the EU and Member States for the research
and development of new military technologies, in order to enhance Europe’s
“strategic autonomy” so that it can “face tomorrow’s threats and… protect its
citizens.”
This will come alongside a renewed security research
programme, and arms industry lobby group ASD is hoping that both are well-financed
– it has noted that “one of the main challenges” will be “to avoid that
currently envisaged funding for defence research will come along with a
reduction of funding for security research.”
Democratic deficit
and the demand for new visions of security
Throughout the development of Europe’s security agenda,
there has been a consistent pattern of democracy playing catch-up to money,
corporate influence and a belief that we can never have too much high-tech
“security”. Throughout the development of Europe’s
security agenda, there has been a consistent pattern of democracy playing
catch-up to money.
Consider, for example, the development of border
surveillance system Eurosur, PNR passenger profiling systems, and the “smart
borders” project that will require the fingerprinting of all non-EU citizens.
All were helped along by EU funding long before legislation on them was
approved or even proposed. Given the far-reaching nature of these projects and
the need for a robust discussion on how to prevent human rights being
superseded by security objectives, this lack of democratic accountability is
deeply disturbing.
The need for compliance with fundamental rights, democratic
values and ethical standards has long been noted in the multitude of EU
documents on security research. Criticisms of the security research agenda
that emerged in the early years of the ESRP have led to more stringent ethical
checks, alongside increased funding for less technologically-determined, more
socially-focused research.
Yet these modifications cannot overcome the political
environment and objectives by which EU security policy is framed. As argued in
a report for the ESRP-funded SURPRISE project:
“Security policies… have increasingly adopted a conceptual approach to
security problems that is strongly solution-driven and tends to neglect the
variety and complexity of social, economic, technical and political factors
that may have caused those security problems in the first place.”
This “solution-driven” approach was perhaps best summed-up
by a drone manufacturer at an EU conference some years ago: “’You’re quite
right’, [they] acknowledged to Statewatch at a drone conference, ‘we don’t
actually know what the problem is; we just know that the solution is UAVs’.” “’You’re quite right’, [they] acknowledged to Statewatch
at a drone conference, ‘we don’t actually know what the problem is; we just
know that the solution is UAVs’.”
However, despite the money invested so far by the EU, the
sought-after “solutions” have not always been forthcoming. For example, the European
Court of Auditors (ECA) reported in 2014 that the External Borders Fund had
been ineffective, seriously deficient and misspent by national governments,
while the formal evaluation of the 2007-2013 ESRP found that very few of the
projects looked likely to result in concrete products (only 11% even reported a
patent application).
At the same time, the ESRP evaluation declared that the most
important results of the research programme were to be found in the development
of a Europe-wide security research community bringing together state officials,
researchers and corporate representatives. It remains to be seen whether the
current incarnation of the ESRP (which runs from 2014 to 2020) will see greater
deployment of new security “solutions” – but by the time a thorough evaluation
has taken place, the next programme (2021-27) will likely be in full swing.
Need for a new
approach
It is clear that Europe faces major challenges, from the
increase in terrorist attacks to the growing impact of climate change, that
require collective responses. The question is whether they require the responses
offered so far: extraordinary legal and policy measures combined with the
development and deployment of new surveillance and control technologies often
based on ideas of hierarchical command-and-control.
The staggering advances in computing power, data storage,
analytical systems and networked devices in the last two decades offer massive
potential to liberate and empower individuals and to democratise societies. At
the same time, the possibilities they offer for enhancing the repressive powers
of states against those deemed unwanted or undesirable – through biometric
identification, predictive policing systems, “less-lethal” weaponry, or the use
of drones and other remote technologies – are truly frightening.
In July 2017 a wide variety of civil society organisations
published an initial position paper on future EU research policy, noting that
“the research that is prioritised and funded today will have a decisive impact
on the future of our societies and our planet.” In relation to security research,
it called for the Commission to ensure that the programme “institutes a
meaningful balance between innovative security technologies on the one hand and
research into fundamental rights, alternatives and root causes on the other.”
However, this is not something that will be achieved simply
by asking politely. Billions of euros in research funding is at stake. Discussions
on the next research budget (as well as all other EU budgetary proposals) will
begin soon – the Commission is currently preparing its proposal for the 2021-27
security research programme, which will be sent to the Council of the EU (national
governments) and the European Parliament to reach their positions before
entering negotiations. The EU has long been
committed to ensuring fundamental rights and civil liberties on paper – there
is now a once-in-seven-years opportunity.
There is thus a significant opportunity for progressive
political forces across Europe to demand a new approach to security research
(not to mention other research themes) as well as new priorities in the funding
of security policies. The EU has long been committed to ensuring fundamental
rights and civil liberties on paper – there is now a once-in-seven-years
opportunity to ensure that research and policy funds are used to put that
commitment into practice.
See the August, 2017 report by Statewatch and TNI, here: Market Forces. Executive summary here.