In the Washington Post last year Michael
Semple (former Deputy to the European Union Special Representative for
Afghanistan) presented five myths on 'talking to terrorists'. He
might have added a sixth: that it is only governments or diplomats that do the
talking. Conciliation Resources’ new Accord
Insight publication puts a spotlight on how communities engage
armed actors, with examples from Syria, Colombia, Northern Ireland and northern
Uganda.
Henriette Useni Kabake, government administrator of Lulingu, South Kivu Province, Democratic Republic of Congo, hosts a meeting alongside traditional leaders and leaders from the Raia Mutombioki armed group / Diana Zeyneb Alhindawi 2014.
There is
compelling evidence to support the case to sit down and talk to armed groups. Between
1975 and 2011, 196 out of 216 peace agreements signed were between states and
non-state actors. Jonathan Powell’s recent book Talking to Terrorists illustrates the complexities of engagement as
well as arguing for the need to reach out to such groups early on. It points to
historical experience that tells us that there can be no purely military
solution to a political problem, as well as recognising the tendency of
governments to reject any option of contact when confronted with a new armed
group.
Accounts
like Powell’s are full of stories of ‘peacemakers’ – those who took political
risks to bring armed groups out of the shadows and persuade them to swap
violent means for non-violent ones. Yet, these descriptions can overlook the
wide range of on-going and constructive contacts with an armed group – that do
not only focus on political negotiations.
In reality there
are a multitude of interactions that take place with non-state armed groups before,
and often well in advance of, ‘official’ contacts. And these often happen at
the local level. The relationship between local populations and armed groups is
much more complex than commonly portrayed. In areas where state institutions
are absent, functional arrangements can emerge between populations and the non-state
actors that fill the space. Such structures often involve traditional,
community, business, as well as armed, actors. They can include extensive governance
structures encompassing service provision, security forces, and financial and
legal regulations, such as those managed by Hamas in Gaza. Or they may involve
loose pacts to negotiate and regulate movement and trade such as those at the
Somali-Kenyan border. Elsewhere, for example the Falls Road area of Belfast (a
stronghold for the IRA), an armed group may provide political and social
authority, and security for long periods of time, with more or less continual
support from the community.
In this way,
local populations are not always passive, simply coerced into accepting the presence
of armed actors. Conversely, armed groups do not simply exploit and abuse the
communities in areas in which they operate. And at times, communities will try
to assert influence over the actions of an armed group. Findings from
Conciliation Resources’ research suggests that ensuring physical safety and
protection of livelihoods are key reasons populations may decide to reach out
to armed groups – for example, to convince a group to reduce the threat of violence
against the community, to ensure access to water, roads and food.
And a community’s
attempt to resist or survive violence can also shape armed groups’ broader strategies
and agendas. In Colombia, the community of Micoahumado was eventually able to
convince the National Liberation Army (ELN) to demine the town and surrounding
roads despite the strategic disadvantage to the group. In Northern Ireland,
civil society actors suggested alternative non-violent forms of community justice to the Republican
Movement, which in turn opened up space to reflect on broader issues of
security and policing in the emerging peace talks. In northern Uganda in the
late 1990s/early 2000s, local religious leaders developed a threefold approach.
They met with high-level commanders of the Lord’s Resistance Army in the bush
to encourage them to: reduce attacks on civilians; allow for the return of
combatants (many of whom were abductees); and think about how the group could
enter into negotiations with the Ugandan Government. They began to facilitate
talks between the Government and the group, and worked with the community to
sensitise it to returnees; prompting a possible demobilisation route for
combatants.
Local
populations will often use pre-existing ties such as ethnic, family and kinship
links to gain access and assert influence. As a result, and in contrast to
external mediators, they benefit from being able to gain a close understanding
of an armed group’s dynamics and motivations during the early, and often the
most violent, stages of a conflict – allowing them to talk to armed actors when
no-one else is.
They are more
likely to adopt cultural and customary norms to appeal to armed groups as well
as demonstrate sensitivity to the groups’ concerns about reputation, employing more
flexible understandings of international normative principles such as human
rights and neutrality. Community leaders in northern Uganda rooted
international justice amnesty frameworks in Acholi traditions of forgiveness.
However, these interactions are fragile, and it is important not to overlook
the risks local actors take to resist or challenge conflict. During intense
fighting, local efforts to reduce violence and promote dialogue may be seen as
contrary to the efforts of warring sides to gain military advantage. Armed
groups do indeed often have a blatant disregard for civilian security, or
worse, deliberately target populations. Local populations also face security
threats from the state, which often views communities close to armed groups as
complicit. And active contact by a community with an armed group can exacerbate
perceptions of association. It is often government restrictions, including proscription regimes and
counter-insurgency tactics, that are more disruptive and threatening to
communities than the behaviour of armed groups – in Micoahumado, a whole
generation of community leaders was forced to leave the village after
accusations by state security forces of siding with the ELN.
These factors highlight the need to expand ideas about when and how to engage
with armed groups, and so ensure better recognition and support to the multiple
efforts involved in supporting an armed group’s transition to non-violence. Conventional
approaches typically involve law enforcement and security measures, and in a
few cases after many years, pursuing diplomatic talks, as in the case of the
IRA and more recently the Taliban. Such an approach conflates ‘talking’ with
‘negotiating’ and assumes that reaching out implies ‘legitimising’ a group’s
actions or agenda. It overlooks the on-going relationships that communities often
have with armed groups which can influence the groups’ behaviour, and the
multiple reasons why engagement may be desirable.
At present, in Iraq, informal arrangements between Islamic State and
tribal factions in different regions are regularly evolving and dissolving, based
on ethnic, cultural, religious affiliation, to ensure security, economic
benefit or political advantage. For communities it may be irrelevant whether a
group threatening their security is an internationally assigned ‘terrorist’ or
whether the insecurity they face is from the ‘legitimate’ state’s use of force
or ‘illegitimate’ non-state violence. They talk to armed groups often because
they need to, and often because a particular group is a governance reality.
Many contemporary conflicts result from a breakdown in state legitimacy
and governance, amplified by the marginalisation of certain groups and the capture
of resources by particular elites. The way in which different actors fill various
political and social spaces during conflicts, how communities adapt and
respond, and how new relationships are forged, has important implications for governance,
reconciliation, and state-society relations in peacebuilding endeavours.
Syrian contributors to the new Accord Insight publication conclude that
in the absence of progress in a formal negotiation process it is important not to lose sight of the
small but significant initiatives taking place at the local level, and their
impact and implications for future solutions to the conflict.