Tackling the kilil system: a critical response to ‘Ethiopia: Climbing Mount Uncertainty’

Regions and chartered cities of Ethiopia, also knows as states, in 1992. Wikicommons/Golbez. Some rights reserved.

René Lefort, in
his recent article, (openDemocracy,
21 October 2018), regrets the “sudden and total loss” of TPLF (Tigray
Liberation Front) hegemony that gave Ethiopia, according to him,
“unquestionable economic successes” and political stability for over two
decades. But, Lefort’s assertion does not withstand scrutiny.  

In terms of 1980s prices, for example, real
income per capita has declined in Ethiopia by more than six-fold. Consequently,
living standards have been going downhill for quite some time in the country. There
is no economy in Ethiopia that one can call an “unquestionable success”.  In fact, Ethiopia’s age-old, hand-to-mouth economy
has long failed to generate wealth to cope with a population explosion unprecendented
the country has ever seen in its history.     

Lefort blames Prime Minister Abiy Ahmad for
“overhastiness”, like, according to him, allowing “the return of formerly
outlawed OLF and A-G7” and the “normalization with Eritrea.” Here, Lefort
overlooks the fruits borne by the Prime Minister’s astute actions. For
instance, normalization with Eritrea has made the port of Assab available to
Ethiopia. It has also helped deny a haven to anti-government rebels, who used
to operate from Eritrea.

I find the following assertion by Lefort particularly
concerning. He writes, “For the founders of National Movement for the Amhara
(NAMA), the Amhara nation is to be defined according to the territorial criterion,
not based on ethnic features. Now this territorial criterion is expansionist.” Here,
Lefort blames the victim. In fact, it is the TPLF that is expansionist because
it has annexed forcibly territories from the Amhara regions of Gondar and Wello.

Lefort assumes that a leadership crisis is responsible
for the current hike in instability in Ethiopia. He thinks that the solution is
“a rapprochement between ODP (Oromo Democratic Party) and TPLF to help put the party-state
machinery back in working thereby sending
a clear and public signal that a dominant force is emerging inside the EPRDF.”

In
the first place, Lefort does not tell us why the replacement of TPLF by the
second generation of OPDO (P. M. Abiy Ahmad and his group) at the centre is a
leadership crisis. The Prime Minister was elected democratically by the ruling
coalition with an overwhelming majority and the TPLF as a member of that
coalition should respect the outcome and support the new leadership.

Lefort’s idea of rapprochement is
undemocratic and diverts attention from the real issue.  The source of the ongoing instability in
Ethiopia is the kilil
system. Kilil has created fragmented markets and isolated peoples, fighting
continuously among themselves for territory.

P. M. Abiy Ahmad and his group have shown a
remarkable acumen in trying to change the political culture in Ethiopia. They
have despised violence and espoused peaceful means of resolving differences,
something new in the history of the country. Turning TPLF’s anti-Amhara,
anti-Ethiopia propaganda on its head, they have embraced tens of millions of Ethiopians,
who have been disenfranchised in their own country for so long by a racist and
cruel kilil system.  

P. M. Abiy Ahmad and his group inherited
the kilil system, they did not create it. They are concerned about the unfair
treatment of millions of mixed descendants by the kilil system. They have shown
an interest in listening to ideas about alternative arrangements that will
treat all citizens equally and fairly. At the same time, they understand their constraints
on moving forward because the TPLF, the chief architect and beneficiary of the kilil
system, is still in the ruling coalition.  

The TPLF, as a matter of fact, sends out
what Lefort calls conditions (read threats) for a rapprochement: “First, full
respect for the constitution. Second, endorsement of the developmental state.
And last, the end of anti-TPLF campaign.”

These “conditions”, of course, cannot be ignored.
The TPLF can leverage its military force amassed in Tigray to shake down the
centre. In the long run, however, these “conditions” will backfire. Tigray is
still poor and relies heavily on the centre for its survival. Over one million
people in Tigray are dependent on a food assistance program. In the short run, these
threats may impede reforms.

No wonder the new leadership has chosen to talk
about a multinational state rather than one Ethiopian nation. A multinational
state, however, cannot resolve the interethnic rivalry and endless territorial
disputes that are threatening to tear the country apart. Such a state will still
deny the tens of millions of mixed-descendants equal citizenship. In Ethiopia, the kilil system was crafted twenty-eight
years ago by victorious ethno-nationalist rebel groups (TPLF & OLF) for
their own self-interest.

In Ethiopia, the kilil system was crafted twenty-eight
years ago by victorious ethno-nationalist rebel groups (TPLF & OLF) for
their own self-interest. Consequently, the system has not allowed the
involvement of all groups and interests of the society at the state center.

Only a democratic transition will ensure all
groups and interests of the society adequate share in the sovereignty and
wealth of their country. However, a democratic transition is not self-willed. Nor
is it imposed from the top. A democratic transition is compelled by compromises
between compatible groups – so that everyone should get something, and no one
should get everything.

In the case of Ethiopia, such compromises may
be worked out between the ethnonationalist camp, on the one hand, and the one-people-one-Ethiopia
camp, on the other. Therefore, the recent push for one-people-one-Ethiopia is a
welcome development. It has potential to induce a democratic transition.

There are three areas where a permanent
consensus may be worked out between these two camps:  First is the reorganization of the society on other
than ethnic or so-called linguistic basis. Second is an all-inclusive national
unity based on equal citizenship, and equality of all languages, religions and
cultures. Third is private ownership of land and a free market economy.

Rene Lefort’s biggest worry is “a race
against time between escalating ethnic conflicts and the emergence of a
powerful leadership.” But, emphasizing the need for a powerful leadership, Lefort
fails to see the connection between ethnic conflicts and the kilil system. A
powerful leadership cannot resolve the endless ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia and
save the country. Only a genuine transition to a democracy can.