Click:bulk confetti cannon
Angela Merkel welcomes Abiy Ahmed Ali to the "Compact with Africa" conference in Berlin, October 30, 2018. Bernd von Jutrczenka/Press Association. All rights reserved.
In his
latest article, René Lefort argues that the reformism of Abiy Ahmed, Prime
Minister of Ethiopia, is bound to fail and that the only way out is through a
return to the hegemonic rule of the past, provided that it corrects some of its
glaring mistakes. Lefort seems to have a low opinion of Abiy’s political acumen
and ability. He finds that his reforms are “not well thought through,” that his
haste to sign a peace agreement with Eritrea was reckless, and that Abiy seeks
reform without having the support of the Ethiopian
Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), and especially of the Tigray People’s
Liberation Front (TPLF). Instead, Abiy prefers to rely “on personal charisma
and personal popularity”. According to Lefort, Abiy has begun to realise his own
limitations. He says that is why, in the last Congress of the party, Abiy was
seen “backtracking” toward a position more sympathetic to ethnic
parties.
Only time will tell whether Abiy is
an able politician and leader or not. However, what we can say for sure is that
the accusation that he attempted to sideline the EPRDF, preferring to rely on his
charisma and popularity, is mistaken. If anything, one position that Abiy has firmly
and consistently held since the beginning of his premiership is his flat
rejection of the demand for the formation of a government of transition that
would include representatives of opposition political parties. He urged all
opposition political parties to prepare themselves for the next election rather
than to call for a government of transition. Yet, the demand of opposition
leaders had some justification, as they doubted that serious reforms could be
undertaken by a coalition of parties that has proven to be undemocratic and
self-serving for the past 25 years. Despite Lefort’s assertion, what many
observers saw as problematic was not Abiy’s attempt to bypass the EPRDF, but
his conviction that he could effect deep changes while using the structure and
cadres of the party.
As to charging Abiy with recklessness
on the grounds that he invited in armed opposition groups and reached peace
with the Eritrean leader, this overlooks a number of important factors. It
would be inconsistent on the part of Abiy to close the political space for some
groups because they opted for armed struggle, subsequent to the blockage of all
other means of protest. Provided that they renounce the use of arms in favour
of peaceful competition, they should be welcomed in the newly opened democratic
space.
Doubtless, some of these groups may
still secretly retain their plan to seize power by means of arms, but until the
intention is firmly established any exclusion would be undemocratic. Lefort
knows that democracy is a risky business involving a constant bet on the
prevalence of reason over emotions and extremism. The same can be said
concerning peace with Eritrea: the constant stalemate was obviously harmful to
both countries. Reason had to prevail and Abiy did what was reasonable, as
opposed to the particular interests that some factions had in prolonging the
hostility between the two countries. I fail to see in what way peace with
Eritrea could be a reckless decision and the continuity of the stalemate more
reasonable.
No life without the TPLF?
The leitmotif of Lefort’s analysis is
the deterioration of social peace and stability since the political and
economic hegemony of the TPLF has been curtailed. According to him, nowhere is
the recklessness of Abiy’s reforms more manifest than in the chaos that
resulted in all the echelons of the state apparatus. Without fear of
exaggeration, he says: “the state has collapsed. The top-down lines of
authority have vanished. There is no respect, no fear. The power vacuum is
abyssal.”
As Lefort sees it, the truth about
Ethiopia is that neither the EPRDF nor the Ethiopian state can function without
the guidance and the authority of the TPLF. He writes this about the
possibility of reform: “Only a strong EPRDF leadership with an affirmed vision
can give it impetus and direction. Having enjoyed hegemony for more than two
decades, the TPLF had more than enough time to become the backbone not only of
the party but also of the state.”
What is baffling here is that Lefort
blames Abiy for ethnic conflicts, displacements, and various local disruptions,
but says nothing about those who are causing these crimes and disturbances in
the hope of undermining the reforms. In his eyes, the reason that prevents the
state from functioning is not “sabotage” but “simple passivity, an attitude of
‘wait and see.’” This explanation is surely designed to take the blame
away from the TPLF and the remnants of the old guard. The state does not work,
not because of internal oppositions to reforms, but because its head, namely,
the TPLF has been cut off. Without the TPLF, the EPRDF is blind and
ineffective. Let it be noted, also, that Lefort never says that these reforms
are necessary and that those opposing them are on the wrong side. The culprit
is Abiy, with his policy of curbing the hegemony of the TPLF. His imprudence
lies in his inability to understand that the only force able to keep Ethiopia
working and united is the TPLF.
Instead of appreciating the relative
peace after such dramatic changes, Lefort’s concern for peace is at best
short-sighted, all the more so as he admits that “day-to-day life carries on in
relative peace in large parts of the country.” Who on earth would expect to see
deep changes occurring without some measure of social disturbance? Ethnic
clashes and displacements were all the more inevitable as Abiy has inherited a
state in complete disarray as a result of prolonged and incessant uprisings in
various parts of the country. The idea that Abiy wrecked a party and a state
machinery that were functional is anything but true.
What ruined the party and the state
was none other than the hegemonic rule of the TPLF.
The spectre of Amhara nationalism
Lefort is right that the alliance
between the Amhara and Oromo wings of the EPRDF made possible Abiy’s election
to premiership. Soon however he is asserting that “the tactical alliance with
the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP) to oust the TPLF, imposed at the very apex –
the so-called ‘Oromara’” has evaporated, the reason being that the ADP has
espoused “ultranationalist and even aggressive positions.” This echo of the
long-standing position of the TPLF towards the Amhara needs qualification. ADP
has become ultranationalist and aggressive because it took some measures to
assert its independence and, most of all, because it started to claim
territories that were unjustly incorporated into the Tigray region. If those
leading the TPLF have ever contemplated the idea that the Amhara will renounce
their right to the annexed territories, they were nothing less than delusional.
As an observer of political
realities, Lefort knows that conflicts resulting from forceful incorporations
of territories will not go away. His characterisation of legitimate claims as
ultra-nationalism raises the spectre of an Amara expansionism in order to break
up any unity between ODP and ADP. It goes without saying that the main
beneficiary of such a break-up would be the TPLF. In this way, Ethiopia
reverses course and goes back to the original position of the TPLF, which is to
guarantee the perpetuation of its hegemony by fomenting a lasting hostility
between the Oromo and the Amhara.
As Lefort sees it, the solution to
the leadership crisis responsible for the unrests and conflicts “engulfing” the
country is an alliance between the ODP and the TPLF against the Amhara. He thus
revives Meles’s old doctrine by stating that, as a result of the resurgence of
Amhara nationalism, “both Oromo and Tigrayans again see a common threat
emanating from the Amhara region.” This “holy alliance” against the Amhara
could be “reinforced by the support of some Southerners, particularly the
Sidama, and by the peripheral affiliated structures.” In other words, everybody
is ready to form a strong party alliance that would provide the necessary
leadership except the Amhara. The latter are the spoilers of the peaceful
integration of peoples under the constructive guidance of the TPLF. Lefort
finds evidence of the emergence of this anti-Amhara alliance in the fact that
in the last Congress “Abiy Ahmed systematically censured criticisms of the
TPLF, particularly by the ADP.”
Now, it does not require exceptional
insight to admit that the Amhara claim of annexed territories, however
legitimate it may be, cannot be solved without igniting war with the region of
Tigray. No less obvious is the fact that, under the present conditions, the
federal government is in no position to implement whatever decision it may take
to right the wrong that has been done. This does not mean that the Amhara
should stop making the claims, but simply that they should wait until such
times that conditions allow a peaceful or imposed resolution of the issue,
which issue is truly turning into one of the thorniest problems of the country.
But in singling out the Amhara, and not the TPLF as the problem child of
Ethiopia, Lefort does no more than echo the textbook belief of the TPLF.
What remains?
If we address this partisanship,
there nevertheless remains the core issue, which is that, as Lefort puts it,
“Abiy does not have the structured political power base commensurate with his
function”–– let me add, with his function as reformer. This faultline is a
reality that Abiy himself acknowledged in one of his recent speeches. He mentioned
one of the options open to him, namely, the recourse to an authoritarian style
of government. But he quickly dismisses this, arguing, correctly, that the
method will put him right back where the two previous governments were. On the
other hand, we note that, contrary to Lefort’s allegation, Abiy does not intend
to marginalize the EPRDF and rely solely on his own popularity. Such a choice
would land him where he does not want to go, to wit, in a dictatorship,
To the extent that the will to reform
means nothing unless it is backed by a reliable and significant political force
and succeeds in being institutionalized, one must concede that the troubles of
the country are nowhere near to being resolved, as witnessed by the recent
event of armed soldiers entering the vicinities of the Palace.
There is all the more reason to say
so, given that Abiy himself knows that the EPRDF machinery is not fully on
board with his reformist agenda. Yet, despite this resistance, which, by the
way, is unsurprising, Abiy seems determined to push reforms through a machinery
that is not fully cooperative.
Does this means that the reforms are
doomed to fail and that to have any chance of success Abiy must restore the
alignment of forces existing prior to his election, notably by giving the TPLF
the prevalent position it had? Or does it require that Abiy change his previous
stand and constitute a government of transition by inviting in opposition
forces, as suggested by some leaders of the opposition? The first option makes
little sense because it asks Abiy to agree to play a role similar to the
previous Prime Minister, Haile Mariam Dessalegn, in which the TPLF governs from
behind the scenes. Lefort promises that things will be different this time,
given that the TPLF has made its own self-criticism and is ready to give up its
hegemonic tendency by its “commitment to a soft landing from the summit to a
more rational position.” This promise reminds Ethiopians of the saying, “fool
me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.” Let there be no doubt that,
after 25 years of brutal rule, for Ethiopians one thing is indisputable about
the TPLF: a leopard never changes its spots.
The second option, namely, a
government of coalition with opposition forces, is unrealistic and, what is
more, unable to solve the problems the country is facing. In light of the
proliferation of ethnonationalist groups, the sidelining of the EPRDF will only
give them a free reign to ignite chaos and the possibility of civil wars. None
of the opposition groups is at the present strong enough to make a significant
contribution in the resolution of the problems. Or else, if they have
appreciable followers, many of them are so impregnated with ethnonationalist
ideologies that they will worsen the problem instead of helping to solve it.
Put differently, by sidelining the EPRDF, Abiy gets nothing in return, nay,
aggravates the problems, weakening his hand further.
What this means is that reforms must,
willy-nilly, occur and continue through the instrumentality of the EPRDF for
the foreseeable future. The EPRDF is the only path toward maintaining the unity
of the country and consolidating it by means of democratic reforms. As to the
objection according to which the EPRDF is unfit for the implementation of real
and far-reaching reforms, the answer must be that one must see things in their
movement rather than in their fixity. For one thing, reformers of the calibre
of Abiy and Lemma Megersa came out of the EPRDF and there is no reason to
assume that, given time, more reformers would not follow suit within the ODP
and the other associated parties. For another, the strength of the reformers is
likely to grow as Abiy vigorously pushes for the renewal of cadres at the
various levels of the party. And this seems to be what Abiy is trying to
achieve: beyond verbal commitments to reform, he wants to gradually fashion the
party by renewing its personnel and outlook.
Given time, the more the reforms take
root, the more the intensity of the problems will decrease, especially those
associated with the TPLF’s obsession to regain its hegemonic position. Lefort
hails the fact that in Tigray “the fusion between the Front and the population
is now almost total. Tigray is the only region that remains globally calm,
probably the only one where the local authorities are not contested and are
even respected.” To my mind, this calm and deference to the TPLF suggest the
silence and fear of repression. As reforms gain ground in the rest of Ethiopia,
they will disturb the political calm of Tigray, with Tigreans wondering why
freedom and democracy should stop at the borders of their region.
If, indeed, Tigreans finally decide
to engage in the battle for democracy, favourable conditions could emerge for
the peaceful resolution of their conflicts with the Amhara region. In a word,
Tigreans have the choice between defending the expansionist policy of the TPLF,
with the consequence that they will never free themselves from its
authoritarian rule, or abandoning expansion in favour of democracy, whose great
reward is the possibility of a lasting peace with the Amhara and all the
benefits that accrue from it.