Commemoration of the Saharawi Republic’s 30th anniversary in liberated territories of Western Sahara. Picture by Jaysen Naidoo. Flickr. Some rights reserved (CC BY-SA 2.0).
In order to better understand the
negotiations between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente Polisario
(Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia el Hamra and the Rio
de Oro), it is paramount to bear in mind the principals of
international law.
Since the ceasefire of 1991 and the
implementation of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in
Western Sahara (MINURSO), the negotiations between the two
conflicting parties to reach an agreement that respects Western
Saharan people’s self-determination have almost become a waste of
time.
Since 1991, the settlement agreement
has just been an instrument of war by other means, where no one cedes
their original positions, namely, the independence for Polisario and
the autonomy for Morocco. Worse, this situation of stagnation of ‘no
war, no peace’ encourages the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) to adopt a new way of negotiation by introducing Special
Envoys in order to find a solution that respects the initial plan for
peace.
However, this approach has no chance
of success since the envoy in charge of the mission has been the
object of demonization from both parties when they feel that their
requests and demands are not received. However, such a situation
usually works more in favor of Polisario than Morocco, since the UNSC
resolutions uphold the right for self determination.
Negotiation as a tool of containment
Since the beginning of the conflict,
numerous envoys and mediators have attempted to broker an asymmetric
power sharing compromise, leaving behind the initial agreement but
taking into account the interests of Morocco to implement a kind of
autonomy of the territory under its sovereignty. Such a compromise is
designed as a geopolitical solution ignoring international laws and
resolutions. Christopher Ross seems to be the only envoy who wants to
endorse and apply the initial agreement for self determination by
holding a referendum directly without any transitional period.
The question of Western Sahara falls
within a conflict of interests between the USA, France, Russia, Spain
and the United Kingdom. Their differences mean that cooperation
between the vetoing states in the Security Council is necessary in
order to find a final agreement.
What I call the containment approach
aims to contain the Polisario through interminable negotiations. In
other words it is an approach that counts on delaying until the
Polisario changes its position to one more favorable to Moroccan
interests. This gives Morocco more weight and flexibility to
maneuver. Indeed, Morocco has gained more time to exploit the natural
resources of Western Sahara such as fish and phosphates. The fishing
industry provides jobs to more than 70 000 people, accounting for 17%
of the GDP of the Western Sahara territory. As for phosphates, this
accounts for 20% of Morocco’s annual budget. Additionally, the
agriculture sectors as well as the eolian or solar energy are also
increasingly contributing to the Moroccan economy.
France, Spain and some other states
of the European Union further benefit from the extraction of Western
Sahara natural resources. In this regard, many foreign companies such
as Kosmos energy, Teredo oil, the French agricultural company Azura,
German Siemens and others benefit from contracts against all
international laws related to the extraction of natural resources in
the occupied Western Sahara territory.
In this case, a new balance of power
would be drawn by the status quo of ‘no peace, no war’ and
Morocco will be in a comfortable situation pursuing its policy of
exploiting natural resources and installing Moroccan settlers from
the north of the country. To do so, Morocco can rely on an efficient
lobbying network. This politics of balance of power system has the
virtues of flexibility and moderation but it is subordinate to the
requirement of an order defined as the equilibrium between both
parties. While the major goal of this new system of negotiation is to
prevent the war in order to avoid any destruction of the containment
order.
This strategy of containment would
enable the USA and France to submit Morocco and Polisario to severe
constraints, which may respect the formal independence of the parties
in negotiation, but often restrict their external freedom of action
and interfere in the negotiations. The three UN Special Envoys, James
Baker, Peter van Walsum and Christopher Ross represent this strategy
of containment.
James Backer (1997- 2004) suggested a
new framework for an agreement based on an autonomous period of five
years under Moroccan sovereignty which would then lead to a
referendum. He tried to introduce the American view which suggests
sharing first then the option of referendum using federalism or the
case of Puerto Rico, a self-governing stateassociated to the United
States as reference. Christopher Ross (2009-present) followed the
same plan and logic, pushing both actors to find a solution which
would have respected Baker’s American model and plan.
Peter van Walsum (2005-2008), backed
by France and the European Union (EU) supported Morocco’s
unilateralist approach without any consideration for international
laws of self determination. During a briefing before the UNSC in
April 2008, van Walsum said that Western Sahara independence was
unrealistic and the UNSC should therefore say so.
To ensure that a new Western Sahara
state is viable, it must not be a threat to French interests in the
region. French troops are permanently stationed in several
neighboring African states, such as for instance Mali. In this
postcolonial era, North-West Africa is regarded as a region where
France’s interests must have the priority over any other foreign
country. Indeed, France is weary of any other influence in this
region. Yet, if North-West Africa is a Francophone region, culturally
and linguistically, Western Sahara is on the contrary largely Spanish
speaking.
France, the USA, Russia, Spain and
the UK are responsible for this stalemate as they view it from a
geopolitical angle, largely ignoring international laws, and thus
maintaining the status quo of ‘no war no peace’.
Morocco’s new strategy to join the
African Union pushed Rabat to build a new road in the El Guergarate
buffer zone region leading to Mauritania which would also be a road
to sub Saharan Africa. Morocco’s decision created even more tension
leading to a new escalation with the Polisario, which refused this
Moroccan fait accompli. For months, Moroccan and Polisario military
forces faced each other until Rabat decided to withdraw under UN
pressure. This latest episode however clearly indicates that a new
conflicting dynamic is on the table.
Escalation
By attempting to build this road,
Morocco miscalculated and underestimated the Polisario strategy and
strength. The later demonstrated to the UN that it has the military
forces to guarantee stability and supervise the border with
Mauritania.
The Polisario have recently won some
judicial battles such as the December 2016 Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) ruling stipulating that any economic agreement
between Morocco and the EU does not include Western Sahara territory.
This ruling is not only a blow to Morocco’s ambitions and economic
relations with the EU, but also limits European interests in Western
Sahara until a durable solution is found to keep peace and stability
in North-West Africa.
Demonizing and refusing to recognize
the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a full member of the
African Union (AU), will not create a climate of trust. Morocco
should therefore examine in greater details the needs and aspirations
of the SADR. Instead, Morocco has been spending its efforts not only
to delegitimize the SADR but also “to present the question of
Western Sahara as a bilateral dispute question between Morocco and
Algeria. However and as the American scholar Jacob Mundy explains,
“Algeria did not create Western Saharan nationalism generally nor
Polisario specifically”.
On the other hand, the SADR perceives
Morocco as a colonial state breaking international laws. The lack of
trust in the UN to fulfil its obligations to facilitate self
determination for Western Sahara could push Polisario to choose other
alternatives for a lasting solution.
Negotiations at a crossroad
Polisario saw the annexation of El
Guergarate as an ‘outrage’ against the principles of the
ceasefire agreement of 1991. It also warned Morocco about the
disadvantages of such a strategy. For Polisario, Rabat’s decision
can only be explained by its inability to convince the international
community of its position over Western Sahara but also by its
national economic difficulties.
For France, the gravity of the
situation also indicates that not only perceptible changes are taking
place there but that the changing international situation with the
new American president and Brexit could well be a further challenge
for the UNSC to maintain peace and a cease fire in Western Sahara.
Western Sahara has become more vital
to the American global strategy and presence in Africa. In these
circumstances, the war of interests will soon trigger a geopolitical
confrontation between France and the USA if a positive cooperation to
resolve the last colony in Africa is not put in place.
Due to the weakness of the Polisario,
negotiations between the two parties have been imbalanced.Theyhave
not been able to gain the full support of the UNSC permanent members.
As a result, the Polisario will continue to face a dilemma between
taking up arms or maintaining the cycle of negotiations without real
hope of finding a lasting solution. France is against the idea of an
independent Western Sahara and will continue to veto any UN
resolution that would go against its interests and those of its
Moroccan ally.
Furthermore, the future of the
settlement agreements depends on the strategy of the new American
administration as well as the next French President to be elected in
May 2017. As a result, the prospects for peace may be further clouded
by disagreement between the USA and France as well as the lack of
laws for international negotiation.