Those were the days: celebrating the liberation of Benghazi from the Qaddafi dictatorship in October 2011. Flickr / Magherabia. Some rights reserved.
Since the fall of Muammar Qaddafi’s regime
in 2011, Libya has been plunged into civil war. No one really knows where it will lead but it
is indefinitely postponing a political
transition essential for the country's stability.
For some time the African Union (AU), Egypt and
Algeria seemed to be key actors in the search for peace but their efforts, under
the patronage of the United Nations (UN), have led only to impasse. Enter Morocco,
which has in recent weeks organised several intra-Libyan round tables under UN
sponsorship.
During one such event in April, in the coastal town of
Skhirate (near Rabat), the UN special envoy, Bernardino Leon, warned that
“the talks would be the last chance to end the conflict” and that “the patience
of Libyans and the international community” was exhausted. And there have even been
media suggestions that some western officials see such talks in Morocco as the
only hope of forming a unity government and halting the fighting.
Continental approach
To thoroughly understand what drives Morocco in the search for peace, a regional,
even continental, approach is required. Yet in the many analyses of the crisis
in Libya and the wider Sahel, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), which
has 28 members (two-thirds French speaking) and is a key geopolitical bloc, has
been neglected if not overlooked. Qaddafi, the mastermind behind the foundation
of CEN-SAD in 1998, had a strategic ambition thereby to reduce French influence
on African countries, while counterbalancing the AU, and poured petro-dollars
into this regional grouping.
Since his overthrow in 2011, however,
CEN-SAD has been deprived of much of its financing, removing any impediments
for France to reactivate its policy in the Sahel—as witnessed since the advent
of the crisis in Mali. For Rabat, controlling CEN-SAD or, at least, being
perceived as a proximate supporter of Libya could be highly beneficial. Such a
strategy would provide this close and historical French ally with an elevated
leading role alongside France, which already has a substantial number of troops
in the region, and an even greater opportunity to influence the Sahel.
In June 2012, a meeting of CEN-SAD
foreign ministers took place in Morocco, officially to find a lasting peace in
Mali. In reality, this was a unique occasion for Rabat to showcase its new-found
interest in Sahel stability.
The fall of Qaddafi and the
changing regional political landscape have provided Morocco with the
opportunity to influence the Sahel states in its own long-term continental
interests. Moroccan diplomats have been extremely active in the Sahel and the Maghreb,
trying to reap the benefits of the continuing geopolitical and strategic
reshuffling.
By giving a lead—directly or indirectly—to CEN-SAD,
Morocco aims to strengthen its international position, in Africa in particular,
which would facilitate the kingdom’s eventual return to the AU. The union currently
recognises as a member the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, which contests Rabat’s
illegal colonisation of the Western Sahara territory since 1975, and so Morocco
remains outside.
Mutual efforts
Like Egypt (and the AU), Algeria is convinced that
only a political solution will eventually put an end to the stalemate in Libya
and privileges political dialogue. Aided by regular diplomatic meetings, these
two north African giants converge behind mutual efforts to find a lasting,
peaceful solution and combat the growing threat from terrorism in the
region.
The recent peace accords in Mali, signed in Bamako,
emerged under the
patronage of Algiers. Yet, despite
hosting various meetings with the different Libyan protagonists, it has not
enjoyed the same success in that arena. It’s not just the complexity of the Libyan
equation but what the Algerian daily El Watan characterises as a ‘two-headed
diplomacy’.
Exerting more pressure on Libyans and putting before them a fait accompli is surely not the best option to find a lasting peace.
Oddly, Algeria has both a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation (MFAIC), headed since September 2013 by Ramtane Lamamra, and a Ministry for Maghreb
and African Affairs and the Arab League (MMAAAL), led by Abdelkader Messahel. Both
are highly respected and experienced diplomats, with a massive knowledge of
African affairs.
Lamamra (dubbed
‘Mister Africa’), a former AU peace and security commissioner, is the chief author of the
reinvigoration of Algeria’s foreign policy, internationally and on the African
continent—for too long neglected. He is also behind the flow of African and
western diplomats, presidents and ministers to Algiers in the past 18 months.
Officially, this dual
diplomacy is due to the numerous international files in which Algeria is
implicated, in Africa and beyond. But this
bicephalous approach is vulnerable to personal rivalries and competitive
ambitions. And, if the former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger once famously asked ‘who
do I call if I want to call Europe?’, foreign chancelleries might soon ask ‘what
foreign ministry shall we call in Algeria?’.
Jumble
To add to this jumble of conferences and round tables,
Ethiopia has recently called for a gathering of African foreign ministers on
Libya, probably during the AU summit to be held next month in Johannesburg. But
given the scale of the challenge, it is hard to envisage any strategy arising
from this meeting, as against a loud diplomatic cacophony. And this multiplication
of initiatives may only complicate an already complex Libyan and regional
geopolitical situation.
Worse still, Leon’s exasperated declaration last month
may not only indicate that the UN is losing ground. Exerting more pressure on
Libyans and putting before them a fait
accompli is surely not the best option to find a lasting peace. And while all actors must help Libyans find an
overdue political solution, the AU and its member states, supported by the UN,
should be the prime driving force.
It is thus paradoxical and puzzling that the UN could
perceive Morocco, though not a member of the AU, as a viable broker for Libya. If
Rabat could harvest any laurels from the thorny Libyan political stalemate, it
would open a regional Pandora’s box—with dramatic consequences for the Western
Sahara conflict. And if the UN has a viable strategy for stability and security
in Libya and the Sahel-Maghreb as a whole, it is not at
all evident what it is.