December 20, 2018. View from Copan building in downtown Sao Paulo, Brazil. (Photo: © Cris Faga/ZUMA Wire). PA Images. All rights reserved.
Nueva Sociedad: In the 1990s there
was a neoliberal hegemony in the region; the following decade, the hegemony was
a progressive/national-popular one. Where are we today?
Juan Tokatlian: It seems to me
that this a topic well worth studying and clarifying. If we take Antonio
Gramsci's reflection as a reference, what we should be analyzing is the
"political, intellectual, and cultural" leadership of certain groups
or classes in specific historical junctures, as well as the sustainability and
reach of that hegemonic leadership – a leadership based on a combination of
consensus and coercion which requires that its exercise of power be accepted by
those who are being dominated.
The first thing we would notice is that
hegemony in Latin America is, in general, transient and weak. Some specific
cases, however, have shown more strength and longevity. Moderately reformist
socio-political and economic projects led by sectors operating under the rules
of the system – that is to say, not anti-system in that they did not have an
outlook of revolutionary change – could not be consolidated in the 1950s and
early 60s. The authoritarian projects of the late 70s and early 80s could not
prosper either. Both had to endure the intense heat of the Cold War in the
periphery.
When the historical dispute between the United States and the
Soviet Union came to an end, the neoliberal project of the 1990s could not
extend itself beyond that decade in most of South America, although it did go
on in some subregions. At the turn of the century – again in South America but
not in Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean – the progressive project
could not go beyond the 15-year mark.
And we are now witnessing the resurgence
of the neoliberal project which, in spite of what is usually said, shows some
traits of fragility in so far as it is based on fragmented and polarized
societies in a context of highly primarized and financialized economies – not a
robust hegemony at all.
We will probably see its consensual components diminish and its coercive
devices grow, and this will tend to generate more instability and conflict in
an increasingly uncertain and aggressive global context. In short, what we are
seeing are limited hegemonic projects which cannot be consolidated because, in
some way or other, they cannot be fully accepted by a substantial part of
society.
NS: Brazil and
Venezuela are two particularly difficult cases: the latter because of its
multidimensional crisis, and the former because it is currently immersed in the
very first contemporary far-right political experiment in the region. How
should both phenomena be addressed from Latin America? What are the risks?
JT: They are certainly
"difficult" cases if by that we mean that although they have been
following different political paths, they are both facing today their greatest
contemporary historical crisis – as a revolutionary aspiration (Venezuela) and
as an ambitious reactionary test (Brazil).
Venezuela and Brazil force us to seriously reflect on something that now may seem far away in time, reminiscent of the democratic transition phase in the region: the military issue
I suppose your question aims at the differences and
singularities which characterize both experiences: the former, possibly, in its
terminal phase, and the latter, uncertainly, in its initial stage. However,
despite their national specificities, I would like to highlight the fact that
they do have much in common.
What is currently happening in these two countries should lead us to raise – yet again – the military issue
in Latin America. The so-called "war on drugs", with its epicenter in
Colombia, Mexico and Central America, has been showing us all along the high
costs and terrible damage caused by the militarization of the fight against
drug trafficking, and the pernicious and perverse effects of confusing the role
of the armed forces and the functions of the police by blurring the line
between defense and public security.
What I would like to stress is the fact that
the cases of Venezuela and Brazil force us to seriously reflect on something
that now may seem far away in time, reminiscent of the democratic transition
phase in the region: the military issue – that is, the issue of the
participation of the military in the management of
the State and of the reach of civil power and democratic control over the armed
forces. In this sense, the rising role of the armed forces in these countries'
institutional life is a relevant fact.
The case of Venezuela is the most emblematic and extreme. There, the
military cover a wide range of functions within the State and have a key role
in sustaining – or, eventually, overthrowing – the political regime.
The case
of Brazil has become significant because some 70 army officers were elected at
the recent elections, due to the fact that senior commanders (besides the
President himself and Vice President Hamilton Mourão) have been appointed to 5
influential positions in Jair Bolsonaro’s cabinet, because the president has
repeatedly expressed his will to increase the involvement of the military in
the fight against organized crime, and because the armed forces are, as a
matter of fact, the guarantors of the "constitutional powers"
(Article 142 of the Constitution) .
In short, it seems to me that it is essential to focus once
again on the military issue in the region in the context of precarious
democracies, considering the current phase of US military power outreach in
Latin America and in the light of a conceivable demonstration effect in the
region of re-politicization of the armed forces.
NS: Is this a setback
for integration or a paradigm shift?
JT: Since the
beginning of the 21st century, different governments in South America have
vaunted their role in the field of integration. Whether for commercial and/or
diplomatic reasons, with business matters and/or values in mind, governments of
different ideological signs have invoked integration with unusual rhetorical
force.
The permanent relaunching of the Common Market of the South
(Mercosur), the original claim of the Union of South American Nations (Unasur),
the founding of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (Alba),
the establishment of CELAC and the formation of the Pacific Alliance (AP) all
come to prove that spirit.
The mood at the beginning of the century was for closer
association of nations. Today, however, the state of integration in South
America is mediocre to say the least.
The region operates politically under the logic of
sociability: coming together in all possible forums, regardless of the
institutional effectiveness and the supposed compatibility of interests.
However, economically, the logic of unilateralism prevails: each actor thinks about
his own domestic market, varies his position on the degrees of national
protectionism without prior consultation, discourages in practice productive
ties between business sectors, and negotiates bilaterally with the United
States or China, for example.
The Lima Group departed even further from established policy in the region by issuing a statement in which it called for the armed forces of Venezuela to express their allegiance to Guaidó
So, sooner rather than later, a collision happens: there
cannot be good sociability with so much one-sidedness. What is more, the crisis
in Venezuela has revealed the current loss of political sociability.
Apparently, CELAC failed to realize the sheer magnitude of the internal and
international problems derived from the tragic situation in Venezuela. Unasur’s
behavior was quite embarrassing, and the six governments of the right-wing wave
in the region which could have steered the organization in a new direction,
actually decided to bury it.
Presidents Iván Duque of Colombia and Sebastián
Piñera of Chile launched the idea of creating PROSUR to replace Unasur, quite
possibly with the aim of laying further siege to Venezuela and perhaps, if need
be, to other countries in the future. Mercosur left Venezuela out and then did
not do much else. The Pacific Alliance never did anything, and even less since
the coming to power of Andrés Manuel López Obrador and the changing of the
Mexican government's political sign.
The Alba members’ contribution has been
inconsequential in helping one of their own to find a political solution and
ways of social reconciliation. And in the midst of all this, the so-called Lima
Group, which was right in challenging the legitimacy of President Nicolás
Maduro’s second term, has taken the unprecedented option of recognizing the
Speaker of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as "president in
charge", even though he does not possess any of the attributes of a
government nor can he exercise any of its basic functions.
The Lima Group
departed even further from established policy in the region by issuing a
statement in which it called for the armed forces of Venezuela to express their
allegiance to Guaidó.
Yet another sign of the times indicating that the role of the
armed forces is reaching an importance and a degree of political incidence
which was believed to have been left behind since the democratic wave of the
1980s.
NS: Will political
change in Mexico have a regional impact?
JT: The sheer size of
the domestic and the bilateral challenges with the US that President López
Obrador's government faces is such that it will take up all of his initial
attention. Mexico's priorities are domestic, and its relationship with its
northern neighbor cannot be substituted by any other.
The impact of the
political change in Mexico on Latin America will thus be less than progressives
in the region are hoping for. It will not, however, be irrelevant.
Let me give a historical and comparative example to help
understand the relationship between Mexico and Latin America. In 1981, in the
midst of widespread violence in Central America, Mexico and France signed a
declaration recognizing the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)
and the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) in El Salvador as representative
political forces involved in the armed conflict in that country.
That was a
blunt gesture in relation to Washington's position on the multiple Central
American crises, and it opened the way for the constitution in 1983 of the
so-called Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela), which in
1985 joined the Support Group (Argentina, Brazil Peru and Uruguay) and sought
negotiated political solutions to the armed conflicts in Guatemala, El Salvador
and Nicaragua. Its performance was, by the way, highly effective.
Mexico was the key architect of that initiative and its role
was fundamental in convincing European countries not to endorse the "low
intensity war" sponsored by President Ronald Reagan in Central America.
38
years later, Mexico has taken the option of a principled policy towards the
Venezuelan situation, it has refused to join the Lima Group and, together with
Uruguay, has called for an international conference on Venezuela. The so-called
Montevideo Mechanism, which has been joined by the countries of the Caribbean
Community (Caricom), is promoting a negotiated political solution.
The impact of the political change in Mexico on Latin America will thus be less than progressives in the region are hoping for. It will not, however, be irrelevant.
Now as
before, Mexico seeks political solutions. In the current case, though, it does
so in a more careful and defensive way, and it is not getting support from the
large and medium-sized countries of South America.
Mexico will definitely keep
on looking at the region and it may exert some degree of diplomatic activism as
long as it does not seriously interfere with its complex and contradictory
relationship with Washington.
NS: How is Latin
America positioning itself as regards the Trump effect and global realignments?
JT: It is useful to
look not only at the United States but also at China, but it is essential to
look at the world from the perspective of the region instead of simply talking
about the great powers.
Latin America has been historically losing gravitation
in the world and seems destined today to diverge more and more. The former
leads to weakness, the latter accelerates disintegration. The two combined
deepen dependence.
Some indicators – among the many that are available –
exemplify that fall. In 1945, when the United Nations was created, the weight
of the regional vote was significant: out of the 51 original UN members, 20
were from Latin America. There are currently 193 countries represented at the
UN, and the dispersion of the region's vote has left Latin America as a bloc
with even less influence.
Data from the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC)
reveal that Latin American participation in total world exports went down from
12% in 1955 to 6% in 2016. According to the World Intellectual Property
Organization, in 2006 the requests for new patents from Latin America were 3%
(requests from Asia were 49.7%); ten years later, they had dropped to 2% (while
those from Asia increased to 64.6%). A recent World Bank report on inequality
highlights that eight of the ten most unequal countries in the world are in the
region: Haiti (2), Honduras (3), Colombia (4), Brazil (5), Panama (6), Chile
(7) ), Costa Rica (9) and Mexico (10).
In turn, as we have already pointed out, integration
initiatives are clearly declining. Weakening and disintegration lead to greater
foreign dependence, either from a declining power such as the United States or
from a rising power such as China. The strategic corollary of this is Latin
America's slide towards gradual irrelevance in world politics and the erosion
of relative autonomy in its international relations.
To this should be added the following observation. I believe
there is some confusion in the region regarding the United States and China.
The United States has not been/is not passive and has not isolated itself as
far as inter-American relations in economic, political, welfare or military
matters are concerned. The US has never "left" the region: it is
there. The Monroe Doctrine has lost its relevance, but this does not mean that
the United States has withdrawn from Latin America. In reality, Washington is
always "coming up" to the region with different policies, focuses and
intensity.
As to China, today Beijing is approaching Latin America with
economic resources, in a pragmatic way, and strengthening State to State ties. The
Chinese regional deployment is thus a more moderate one and it favors the
status quo, which in turn facilitates the absence of local players with veto
capacity, as did happen in relation to the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
In response to what has been happening since the 1990s, the
region has come up with a so-called policy of "reliable engagement"
towards China. However, Latin American countries should begin to contemplate a
different and mixed strategic option towards China – that is, a policy combining
approximation and foresight.
Latin America has been historically losing gravitation in the world and seems destined today to diverge more and more.
In short, if Latin America is to avoid a double dependency in
relation to the United States and China, it should urgently recognize that it
is up to itself to strengthen its power attributes regionally. The declining
slope of the autonomy of the countries in the region is bound to get steeper if
they keep to the current path.
NS: Everybody is now
looking at Venezuela. But what about Colombia? What is happening there?
JT: The case of
Colombia is particularly interesting because there, in a way, all the issues we
have been talking about intersect there. Colombia is an enduring South American
democracy (since 1958) which has been through a combination of prolonged
political violence, relative economic stability, and a clear leadership at the
top exercised by a social elite.
With all the contradictions derived from the temporary
predominance of different fractions of the elite, with a combination of
coercive resources and consensual devices, without a clear distinction between
the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods in terms of its relationship with
the United States, Colombia is a perfect example of a peculiar hegemony in
South America.
There, the role of the military linked to the fight against
insurgency and the war on drugs has been a lasting one. A peace agreement was
reached with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) which the
current government abides by in dribs and drabs – and meanwhile, 93 social
leaders and 85 former members of the FARC were murdered in 2018.
Colombia has been a key player within the
Lima Group and it is the country whose leaders have been most intense in their
criticism of the Maduro regime. They have even been tempted – at the moment it
is just that – to join Washington in a more aggressive strategy towards
Venezuela.
It should be added that, at the present juncture, the
relevance of Colombia for the United States has increased significantly.
Washington has identified a so-called "axis of tyranny" formed by
Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela.
The only Latin American country which maintains
simultaneous tense relations with all three is Colombia. Colombia used to have
a very good working relationship with Cuba as a result of the latter’s role in
the negotiations with the FARC, but this has been replaced today by friction
since the collapse of the dialogue between the Colombian government and the
National Liberation Army (ELN), which was taking place in Havana.
An ELN attack
in Bogota led to the end of the talks. Bogotá is now demanding the extradition
of the ELN members who were sitting at the negotiating table and Havana has
replied that the existing protocol for breaking negotiations must be
implemented. The Duque government has unusually increased its criticism of
Cuba.
On the other hand, tensions with Venezuela began with the coming to power
of President Chávez and increased markedly after the failed coup against him in
2002.
If Bogotá has historically looked to the North and its bond with the United States has been always a close one, it has now embraced Washington with a heightened ideological conviction and greater pragmatic motivation
Finally, Colombia maintains with Nicaragua a historic maritime dispute
that led to a ruling by the International Court of Justice (CIJ) favorable to
Managua, and a new one is being expected from the CIJ that could reheat the
already poor Colombian-Nicaraguan relations.
At the same time, we must bear in mind that Colombia, which played an
active role in the promotion of the Pacific Alliance, has retreated from it
since the arrival of López Obrador in Mexico, and has reinforced its links with
another right-wing government in the region: Piñera’s government in Chile.
If
Bogotá has historically looked to the North – expressed in the respice polum Colombian doctrine – and
its bond with the United States has been always a close one, it has now
embraced Washington with a heightened ideological conviction and greater
pragmatic motivation.
Colombia is notoriously aligned with Washington and that will
not change. The interesting thing, in any case, is that Buenos Aires, Brasilia,
Santiago, and Lima – among others – seem, in the present juncture and in their
own way, more willing to follow in the footsteps of Bogotá and put the United
States as their preferred diplomatic option.
The results of this will have to
be assessed in terms of the material well-being, national security and international
autonomy of the societies of the region. That is another chapter which will
have to be monitored rigorously and systematically. We are a region adrift in
global affairs and that is dangerous… for us.
This article was previously published in Nueva Sociedad. Click here to read the original content in Spanish.