Hans Blix. The Official CTBTO Photostream. All rights reserved.
52Insights (52):
Let’s go back in time in your distinguished career. You were the first western
representative to inspect the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster and you
were also a central figure in the fiasco in Iraq. Is it easy for you to
comprehend the pivotal roles that you’ve played in these huge moments in
history? What are your feelings when you look back on those events?
Hans Blix (HB): It’s been a privilege to take
part in, and play a role, sometimes important, sometimes less important in a
number of events.
Chernobyl
of course remains a great disaster. I’m still chairing a committee that meets
in London that helps finance reconstruction and sheltering. The Chernobyl
accident occurred in 1986 and governments around the world were very angry that
the Russians didn’t inform them immediately. We chose to contact them and ask
how we could help and they responded by inviting me, with two collaborators to
come to Moscow. We were extensively briefed about the accident and then taken
to Chernobyl in a helicopter to see the black smoke. We tried to learn as much
as we could and then we gave a big press conference in Moscow about what we had
seen and learnt. It was exciting just to be there because this was when perestroika was beginning and we know
that there had been discussions about whether we should be invited or not. They
had some fear I suppose about what we would say because we were free to say
what we wanted. It turned out that the Russian population was thrilled by what
we were saying as independent observers because they didn’t believe what their
government was telling them. Of course things were pretty bad but their fear
had been that it was even worse. So that was sort of a victory for glasnost in Russia.
What we
did following Chernobyl, apart from this huge conference, was that we managed
to have an international conference at which two conventions were drafted, one
on the duty of states to inform the world about accidents that happen and the
other one about the co-operation to allay the consequences of accidents.
52: If we fast
forward to the nineties when you experienced your first major brush with the US
and Iraq. You were first deployed to check for the possibility of nuclear
weapons. This was when the IAEA was asked to investigate and the special
committee – the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was set up. Talk us
through that period.
HB: Yes, it was a rather painful affair. In
Washington we had enemies who said that the IAEA had failed to discover what
Iraq had been doing and that we were incompetent. They wanted to have a new
body set up and exclude the IAEA from the investigation. Well luckily this
didn’t happen, but at the same time it’s clear to this day that the State Department
succeeded partly in their attempts to take control of the whole inspection.
They did so through the UNSCOM commission and we had many frictions with them.
In at least one of the major missions that we had, we discovered that members
of our team were all appointed in UNSCOM. Then towards the end of the nineties,
this bubble burst and UNSCOM was revealed to be an instrument of the CIA. At
the end of 1999 the Security Council decided to set up the United Nations
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) which I came
out of retirement to become chairman for.
52: We talked
with a professor of political science at MIT, Stephen Van Evera and he made a
very interesting point. He said that a lot of very successful political action
is based around the construction of theatre. Did those periods ever feel like
theatre to you?
HB: The theatrics that you referred to was
not anything that we tried to engineer. We did not seek such theatrics. But
nevertheless we had the world’s attention. I made two speeches at the Security
Council which were printed in the New
York Times. I don’t think I’ve ever seen so many cameras at the Security
Council as when I was there at that time.
I think
it’s simple. I regarded myself and my colleagues as international civil
servants. The governments ultimately make the decisions but they must have the
most honest dossier in front of them as possible. They claim that that’s what
they want, though in reality they don’t always, and they may try to influence
the civil servants in their biases. UNSCOM In the nineties was just a very
large remote control, but we were not. We were there to find the truth. In the
autumn of 2002, having seen how the Iraqis had closed their doors to
inspectors, I too suspected there might be biological and chemical missiles. I
thought they may very well be hiding something. But nothing nuclear. We were
pretty sure there was nothing nuclear.
As we
went along with our inspections we began to realise we couldn’t prove anything.
You can’t prove that something doesn’t exist, but you can get a strong
impression, and it gradually became less deeply believed that there was
anything to find. And we reported that to the Security Council.
52: And you were
the person that held the potential answer to that one important question – did
they have weapons of mass destruction or not?
HB: Many people now say that we were right
when we reported there were no weapons. But we never said that. We said, we’ve
carried out several hundred inspections, we have been to dozens of sites that
you recommended, and we have not found anything in these places. We didn’t say
there can’t be anything. There could have been.
52: How much
contact did you have with characters such as Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney,
George Bush and Condoleezza Rice?
HB: I met Bush and Cheney once and that was
unpleasant, but my relations with Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell were fine.
And as I wrote in my book, I warned both Blair and Rice very strongly, even
more strongly than I had made the point at the Security Council.
52: The intelligence complex itself is fascinating and
such an integral part of your career, you’ve gone on record as saying there is
as much information as disinformation. What do you mean by that?
HB: I spend perhaps three hours a day
reading newspapers and various blogs and when you take in information from
various quarters you try to find a picture that you believe. The fact is that
the media is dominated from information from the western side. I read the New York Times every morning and I think
it’s very good, I couldn’t live without it. That and the Financial Times, The Guardian
and a few others, but they too have their biases. And you need to get
information from the other side. You need to go to the sources. I think I
get a better picture of the world this way but it’s not easy.
52: You seem very
diplomatic in the way you speak even though you have gone on record several
times saying, “I am of the firm view that [the Iraq invasion in 2003] was an
illegal war.” Yet you also say “the Americans had a legitimate standpoint”.
Looking back on it now were you comfortable with your position?
HB: Well I think it’s true that
international civil servants, even up to the secretary general of the UN are
invariably courteous to their bosses. I remember when Colin Powell came to talk
to the Security Council, he had a telephone conversation that he had bugged and
which he played to the whole council. I asked myself, well what is the proof
that these are authentic? We were sceptical but we were also very courteous in
the way we questioned these things.
Another
example is when Mohamed ElBaradei insisted that the IAEA should be given a copy
of the alleged agreement between Iraq and Niger about the import of yellowcake
uranium, and that document had been cited by both Bush and the US congress.
Eventually the IAEA were given a copy and it took them less than a day to
establish that it was a fake audit. When Mohamed came to the Security Council
the way he phrased it was that the document was not authentic. Everybody in the
Security Council were well educated enough to know that this meant it was
forged, but I think the media might well have reported it differently if he had
actually used the word fake. That’s a much tougher word. And I think you find
traces of that sort of thing in my speeches, some deliberately courteous
language.
This is
where I stand. I think it would have been wiser if they had decided to delay an
invasion. Our inspections could have continued and wouldn’t have yielded
anything and then I don’t think they would have then been able to invade Iraq.
"I’m asking myself the question now, which was
worse, Saddam or anarchy?"
52: If we look at
some more recent events, were you prepared at all when the Arab Spring happened
in 2011? What were your thoughts when all of that was taking place?
HB: When the Arab spring came I was as
elated as anyone else and it was only gradually that I began to feel that the
experience of Iraq was one that was repeating itself. I was in favour of the
intervention in Libya. In distinction to Iraq I felt that it was the Security
Council’s decision. America and the west took advantage of the situation, the
Russians are right in that, but nevertheless I felt at the time that there was
a risk of a massacre in Benghazi so I was in favour of it. I am now becoming
more sceptical about the possibility of intervening positively in these
situations. I’m asking myself the question now, which was worse, Saddam or
anarchy? That was the choice. Some people say that we didn’t stay long enough
at the job, but is it even really possible for an outsider to plant democracy
in a place like Iraq? In Libya it’s failing miserably and it has failed in
Egypt and it’s very shaky in Tunisia.
These
things have to act out over time. We still have the Castro’s in Cuba. In North
Korea we see a regime that is absolutely horrendous. It’s a sad observation but
these things take a long time.
52: In terms of
what the future looks like, I think a lot of people feel it’s a precarious one.
As an advocate for peace, what does peace look like to you in the future?
HB: I’m optimistic. We have come a long way
in terms of achieving peace. The UN is now in its seventieth year. We can now
add what I call MED, Mutual Economic Dependence to the things we already had as
an assurance against war, mainly MAD, Mutually Assured Destruction, which arose
after the Cuban affair in 1962.
Yes, the
situation is terrible in Syria, it is terrible in the Ukraine and Sudan and
many other places but we used to fight each other here among the Nordics too.
The Swiss and the Danes and the UK as well. Now because of the European Union,
you cannot have these wars in Europe. You also cannot have a war between US and
Mexico, or a war in South America, I’m pretty sure of that.
In terms
of worrying about the future I would be more concerned about Asia. There are
two giants out there, China and India. They have a common border in the
Himalayas and they both sit on horrendous weapons. Nevertheless I’m still
somewhat optimistic that diplomacy can triumph.
Looking
at the future I’m more worried about global warming. I feel desperately unhappy
that we’ve not been able to persuade people that nuclear power has tremendous
potential. It’s not totally without risk, but on the other hand nothing is. I
feel sorry that for all these years I’ve spent on improving nuclear safety and
efficiency and now even in Sweden there is talk about closing four nuclear
power plants prematurely. And Germany is closing all of theirs. I am
passionately interested in nuclear energy and its connection with the
environment. I’m convinced that nuclear power has a potentially vast role,
though we have not yet succeeded in allaying people’s fear of radiation. So
energy and the environment are focal points and I’ve worked at improving
peaceful relations and developing international law for that purpose.
Paris and
COP21 will be very far from achieving what we need today, but it will mark
progress compared to where we have been. The gravity is beginning to sink in.
Big business seems to have come further than many governments. More record
temperatures, storms, floods, heat waves, melting glaciers and dying polar
bears combined with alarming reports about inadequate restraint in CO2
emissions will create greater global readiness for action. The media, who are
the only ones thriving on disaster, will help in this process.
52:You’re in
favour of nuclear energy but you’ve also been seen as a public figure standing
against nuclear weapons. Do you think this stance may appear to some people
paradoxical?
HB: Yes I think it does. I have friends who
are against nuclear power. They hate nuclear, peaceful or not. And I say for
god’s sake aren’t you using X-rays occasionally? I’ve given lots of speeches on
this but I think in the long run what will win for nuclear power is the good
reliable functioning of it without any accidents. Accidents like Chernobyl and
Fukushima shake the whole world, and that sets us back. If we hadn’t had
Fukushima I think we would have a great deal more nuclear power stations now.
Hans Blix. The Official CTBTO Photostream. All rights reserved.I’m in
favour of all research into alternative ways to reduce carbon emissions but
nuclear is there now. I’m chairing an International Advisory Board in Abu Dhabi
and I’m going there next week. They are building four reactors of 1,400
megawatts each so that’s no small thing. "Looking at the future I’m more worried about
global warming. I feel desperately unhappy that we’ve not been able to persuade
people that nuclear power has tremendous potential."
52: What are your
thoughts on the chaos and turmoil around Syria and its wider implications for
the stability of global politics?
HB: I think the US is right – and has been
right – to bomb ISIS targets. Legally, I see the bombings as permissible
‘collective self-defence’ at the demand of Iraq that is attacked by ISIS from
Syrian territory with Syria unwilling or unable to prevent the attacks.
Perhaps
the US has not worried much about the legality, but the UK parliament was at
first reluctant to allow British planes to bomb ISIS in Syria. Tragically, much
of the war on the ground is a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
In my
view it would be unwise for the US or other western states to send their ground
troops to fight ISIS. Even though the Arab world is opposed to ISIS, it does
not want to see American or other western troops again on ground. Nor is the US
public keen to see US boots on the ground. There remains to try to destroy ISIS
by ‘choking’ it – deny it resources by bombing oil transported to be sold,
weapons deliveries, preventing money being transferred to ISIS from rich
sources in the Arab world. So far, this has not been effective, but with the
exception of the bombing it does not seem to have been carried out on a large
scale yet.
I think
Obama has been right in resisting the ever louder voices of the many US hawks
who feel the world sheriff is mandated to send boots on the ground. He and
Kerry, I believe, seek to get all fighting parties, except ISIS, to sit around
a table and agree on a ceasefire. Kerry hates war. They want to work out some
scheme for power sharing. Assad personally would withdraw, but the Alawite
regime, supported by Iran and Russia, would take part. It still represents
considerable military power. Now that the Iran deal does not demand all their
efforts perhaps Obama and Kerry can take on this bundle of snakes.
52: Hans, our
last question to you would be what would you like your legacy to be?
HB: To have contributed to a more honest
and competent international civil service. We need an organisation based on
professionalism and truth seeking. As I’ve often said, I admire those who seek the truth and I’m a little worried
about those who have it.
This interview was originally published on the 52 Insights
blog on December 17, 2015.
All images courtesy of
Hans Blix and The Official
CTBTO Photostream.