Mohammed El Raai/AP/Press Association Images. All rights reserved.In May,
2015, the Cairo Court for Urgent Affairs issued a controversial verdict that
effectively banned the activities of Ultras football fan groups, without
exception.
More
stunning, however, was the court’s decision to declare them a “terrorist organization,” a label usually reserved for the
most heinous of offenders by government standards. In a matter of minutes on a
Saturday afternoon, all Ultras-related activities were henceforth criminalized.
The court
ruling spread across Egypt and reverberated with the enraged youth appalled by
the government’s open resentment for their dissent. A group instrumental in the
revolutionary protests that ousted Pharaoh-like ruler Hosni Mubarak had
officially been labelled as a terrorist threat.
The effect
was immediate: society, fatigued by a severely weakened economy, protests and
revolutionary aftermath in general, shunned the football group.
A four-year
legacy of heroism, dissension and martyrdom had come undone.
Crossing the rubicon
While the
2015 court ruling served as a pivotal moment in the Ultras' shift in popularity,
the group’s fall had already been triggered months prior. What appeared to be a
sudden collapse can more accurately be described as a slow decay of ideas and
unity.
The Ultras
earned their reputation as vandals and violent instigators through their
increasing participation in ill-advised street altercations in the years
following the Arab Spring.
It is
important to note that the term “Ultras” is applicable to several groups within
Egypt and does not necessarily denote a single unified entity.
While the
Ultras Ahlawy remain the most popular faction of the hardcore football fan
group, much of the trouble that ensued over the past couple of years can be
traced to the Ultras White Knights (UWK) that supported the Zamalek SC football
club.
The schism within
the Ultras was particularly evident when 19 people were killed outside the
Cairo Football Stadium in clashes on February 8. Most of
those who died suffocated when a crowd of football fans stampeded to get
away from tear gas thrown by security forces. All of the dead were members of
the UWK group.
The tragic
event brought back harrowing memories of the 72 Ultras Ahlawy fans who died
during the Port Said massacre in 2012. As a result, the Ultras White Knights
Facebook page referred to the incident as a “massacre” caused by the security forces, and paid
tribute to their fallen martyrs. Shortly thereafter, the public prosecutor ordered
the arrest of the UWK leaders as part of the investigation.
"Huge
numbers of Zamalek club fans came to Air Defense Stadium to attend the match
… and tried to storm the stadium gates by force, which prompted the troops to
prevent them from continuing the assault," the interior ministry told Reuters.
Eventually,
16 Ultras, alleged to be members of the Muslim Brotherhood, were given prison
sentences.
Naturally,
the prosecution’s decision to persecute the Ultras leaders further aggravated
the youth. Protests and attacks ensued, which promoted more criticism and
resentment towards the group.
This
eventually culminated when Al Zamalek SC president Mortada Mansour, a
controversial figure and army supporter, alleged that members of the Ultras
White Knights attempted to murder him and barred him from entering his
own club’s headquarters. It was
Mansour’s request that the Ultras be officially labeled a terrorist
organization.
Ultras as ‘terrorists’
The
decision to label all Ultras groups indiscriminately terrorists is one that
is obviously favorable to the Egyptian government and incumbent military
dictatorship.
The Ultras,
despite their splintered groups and fragmented unity post-Arab Spring,
represented a significant anti-government force, one that had helped topple a
30-year-old regime.
To end the
Ultras’ legitimacy as a peaceful opposition group was to end an entire segment
of the youth population’s sole opportunity to voice frustration and dissent.
Historically,
the Egyptian government has feared opposition groups that they could not
control or understand. During Mubarak’s regime, the Ultras were seen as an
unknown entity with dangerous capabilities because of their united front, sheer
numbers in youth, and consistent funding.
For
decades, unauthorized gatherings were banned under Martial Law. The government
heavily monitored political activity and the country’s youth to determine
potential unrest or rebellion. At the sight of Ultras groups at football
matches, state paranoia morphed into police brutality.
By 2016, the
government’s crackdown on the formerly hailed revolutionaries had only
heightened. In July, 20 Ultras “Green Eagle” members were arrested in Port
Said after others heard them chant against the police and the state.
In October,
48 UWK members were arrested
outside of the Alexandria train station ahead of a handball game. No reason was
given for the arrests. Less than two weeks later, another 56 White Knights
members were arrested
on charges of possessing fabricated tickets for a match.
“They are
being punished along with all other factions who took part in the revolution,
whether activists, journalists, or civil society, but they have endured the
most severe consequences, along with the Muslim Brotherhood as the two groups
who have faced real massacres,” Dalia Abdel Hamid, a social researcher who has
studied Ultras groups, said when attempting to explain the ongoing
crackdown.
Despite a
revolution and two toppled regimes over a six-year period, the Egyptian
government continues to operate with a strategy of intimidation and retaliatory
paranoia similar to that of their ill-fated predecessors, doomed to forever
repeat history.
A complicated legacy
During a a
speech at Cairo’s Opera House last January, Egypt’s president Abdel Fattah Al Sisi
declared 2016 the ‘Year of the Youth‘. The event was dedicated to the launch of
the ‘Egyptian Knowledge Bank,’ an international digital library project aimed at educating Egyptian citizens.
The former
military commander cited the importance of sports development for Egypt’s youth
and deemed it essential to increased participation in international
competitions. It was a speech that resonated with those who took it at face
value.
For others,
like the scores of Ultras fans banished from stadiums and from participation in
society, the speech fell on deaf ears. Sisi made no mention of the troubled
Egyptian football league or its legions of disgruntled supporters. His speech
offered promises of sport complexes and state prestige through international
participation, yet ignored the core problems afflicting the nation’s youth.
the heroes of January 25 had become the thugs of Sisi’s Egypt
Yet while
the Ultras protested and continued to resist violent suppression, their
supporters dwindled and their once defiant appeal was extinguished. As far as
many were concerned, the heroes of January 25 had become the thugs of Sisi’s Egypt.
The Ultras’
fall from grace can be traced back to several pivotal moments over the course
of their decade-long existence. Their willingness to participate in non-peaceful
demonstrations in the aftermath of the revolution is among the main reasons
that accelerated their downfall.
It allowed
for key figures within politics and media, like Zamalek SC president Mortada
Mansour, to lambast them for their supposed insolence and to eventually sway
public opinion against the fan group.
By the time the 2015 court ruling that
marked them as a terrorist group was announced, few came to the Ultras’ defence.
Indeed, some even welcomed it, unaware of or unsympathetic to how it infringes
on their basic human rights.
The Ultras’
turbulent existence earned the group a complicated legacy. They began as a
non-political entity of hardcore football fans looking for an outlet to express
themselves. Constant clashes with the police morphed them into a symbol of
defiance and opposition to oppressive government forces.
At a time
of heightened tension between Mubarak’s government and civil society in
general, the Ultras were a cornerstone of the youth resistance. It was only
during the 2011 uprising that the group began to influence Egypt’s political
landscape.
In the
immediate aftermath of the revolution, the Ultras were celebrated as heroes and
honored as martyrs. They earned a place in civil society and demanded that
their voices be heard. And yet six years removed from that turning point in
Egyptian history, the group has endured two massacres, countless deaths,
endless protests and their eventual exile from Egyptian sports, politics and
society. Thus is the reward for sacrifice in Egyptian politics.
As history
looks back on the incredible socio-political movement that emerged from
passionate football fandom in Egypt, will it remember the disobedient hooligans
who supposedly disturbed society, or will they remember the fans who died
protecting their country and defending its future?
Even the
Ultras cannot answer that question. In the words of one of the group’s
members,
‘[The
Ultras] can promise only one thing: we will stay on the street.’